Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons
Faculty Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2019

Kondo-ing Steele v. Bulova: The Lanham Act’s Extraterritorial
Reach via the Effects Test
Margaret Chon

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Margaret Chon, Kondo-ing Steele v. Bulova: The Lanham Act’s Extraterritorial Reach via the Effects Test,
25 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 101 (2019).
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/821

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Seattle University School of
Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

FINAL_CHON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/1/19 11:34 PM

ARTICLE
KONDO-ING1 STEELE V. BULOVA:
THE LANHAM ACT’S EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH VIA
THE EFFECTS TEST
MARGARET CHON*

“Jurisdiction is a word of many, too many, meanings.”2
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1
Ben Zimmer, Kondo-ing: A Guru of Organizing Becomes a Verb, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kondo-ing-a-guru-of-organizingbecomes-a-verb-11547745648 (describing MARIE KONDO, THE LIFE-CHANGING MAGIC
OF TIDYING UP (2014)). “Kondo-ing” is a neologism based on this recent best-seller
and Netflix hit; it refers to “tidying up” while “keeping only those things that spark joy.”
Kondo, WIKTIONARY, https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Kondo [https://perma.cc/FE28VZ8D] (last edited Feb. 21, 2019).
*
Many thanks to the participants in this symposium, including the editors of the
Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law for extending the invitation,
as well as to the participants of the Eighth International Intellectual Roundtable held
at Florida State University College of Law for their support. I am indebted to Professor
Tim Dornis for sharing his database on post-Steele cases and for his comments, to
Associate Dean for Faculty Development Brooke Coleman, Professor Rochelle
Dreyfuss, Professor Camilla Hrdy, Professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Professor Lisa
Ramsey, Professor Marketa Trimble, and Professor Howard Wasserman for their
insights, as well as to Professor Carys Craig for sharing her expert understanding of
Canadian trademark law. Not least, thanks to Brian Ernst (class of 2020), Lauren
Sewell (class of 2019), and reference librarian LeighAnne Thompson for their
research support. Any errors are mine.
2
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).
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INTRODUCTION
The 1952 Steele v. Bulova3 seems ripe for an update, a re-boot, or —
in a (new) word: a kondo-ing. In the over sixty-five years since the
Supreme Court decided the issue of the extraterritorial reach of the
Lanham Act, the Court has shifted the procedural basis for
extraterritoriality analysis. Furthermore, the various circuit court
articulations of Steele’s so-called “effects test”4 have resulted in some
doctrinal unruliness. And Congress has significantly amended the
Lanham Act to include, among other new rights, anti-dilution. The recent
decision in Trader Joe’s v. Hallatt shows why all of these developments
have now come to a head.5
Defendant Michael Hallatt’s “rebel Canadian grocery”6 — cheekily
named Pirate Joe’s — served customers in the Vancouver, Canada area
who were not able to shop at the plaintiff’s U.S.-based Trader Joe’s retail
store located just across the border in Bellingham, Washington. Having
lived in the U.S. for a time, Hallatt had become a connoisseur of Trader
Joe’s often unusual food products.7 Doing business as Pirate Joe’s,

3

Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
Id. at 286 (“In the light of the broad jurisdictional grant in the Lanham Act, we
deem its scope to encompass petitioner’s activities here. His operations and their
effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign nation.”).
5
Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt (Hallatt II), 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016); Trader Joe’s
Co. v. Hallatt (Hallatt I), 981 F.Supp.2d 972 (W.D. Wa. 2013).
6
Amanda Holpuch, Rebel Canadian grocer Pirate Joe’s prepares for Trader Joe’s
court
battle,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
30,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/30/pirate-trader-joes-court-battletrademark-rights-canada [https://perma.cc/HCG5-7SFF].
7
Kevin Drews, Trader Joe’s Loses Lawsuit Against Michael Hallatt’s Pirate Joe’s,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/04/traderjoes-loses-lawsuit-michael-hallatt-pirate-joes_n_4041755.html
[https://perma.cc/B5CR-FVC5].
4
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Hallatt provided genuine Trader Joe’s items, which were sourced from
authorized U.S. retail outlets, to underserved Canadian customers.8
Hallatt believed that Trader Joe’s trademark rights were exhausted once
these items were sold to him.9 His sales pitch did not disguise the fact
that he was plying goods bearing trademarks belonging to Trader Joe’s.10
Unlike most gray market goods,11 Pirate Joe’s sold these genuine
products to Canadian customers at higher prices than they would be sold
for in the U.S.12 Presumably, this mark-up reflected his customers’
willingness to purchase specialty food items, such as dark chocolatecovered edamame from Trader Joe’s, without traveling across the
border—a sometimes unpleasant and often challenging prospect post9/11.13
Plaintiff Trader Joe’s was none too pleased with this across-the-border
sale of its products. Despite the undisputed facts that Trader Joe’s did
not sell goods in Canada, operate a retail store in Canada, or have
Canadian trademark rights, it issued a cease and desist letter.14 It then
sued Hallatt — a Canadian citizen (who had U.S. legal permanent
resident status yet was apparently domiciled in Canada)—for violations
of the federal Lanham Act and Washington state law15 in the U.S. District
8

Holpuch, supra note 6.
Drews, supra note 7. See also Christine Haight Farley, Territorial Exclusivity in
U.S. Copyright and Trademark Law 59 (Am. U. Wash. Coll. of L., Paper No. 201430), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443395 (“U.S. trademark law generally follows an
international exhaustion regime with two exceptions. A national exhaustion rule for
parallel imports exists in two categories: materially different goods and identical
goods and marks manufactured abroad. In the first category, protection stems from
whether there are differences between the foreign and domestic product. The
difference need not be material; a court should consider any alteration in the product.
In the second category, protection depends on whether a foreign importer has the
same origins as the U.S. trademark holder. A relationship may permit parallel
importation.”).
10
Holpuch, supra note 6.
11
Pirate Joe’s products were “so-called ‘gray goods,’ that is, trademarked goods
manufactured abroad under a valid license but brought into [a] country in derogation
of arrangements lawfully made by the trademark holder to ensure territorial
exclusivity.” Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 777 F. Supp.
161, 166 (D.P.R. 1991). See also 19 C.F.R. § 133.23 (“Restrictions on importation of
gray market articles”). Hallatt was purchasing authentic goods in the United States to
re-sell them as ‘Canadian grey goods,’ which is not the typical gray market scenario
considered by U.S. courts.
12
Holpuch, supra note 6.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2016) (asserting the following claims: “(1)
federal trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); (2) unfair competition, false
endorsement, and false designation of origin, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); (3) false
9
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Court for the Western District of Washington.16 The district court granted
Hallatt’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.17
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court, finding first that the district court erroneously decided the
complaint on jurisdictional grounds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP” or “Rule”) 12(b)(1), instead of considering the case on its merits
as FRCP 12(b)(6) directs.18 The court of appeals then proceeded to
consider the case under the so called “Timberlane” test — the Ninth
Circuit-specific version of the more general effects test for analyzing
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.19 Both the court of appeals and the
district court used substantially the same effects test on identical facts,
but they reached opposite results on different procedural grounds.
Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, the Ninth Circuit treated
the allegations in the Trader Joe’s complaint as true, found them
plausible, and decided that the complaint withstood dismissal on the
merits. It concluded that the Timberlane test’s three factors favored
extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.20 Notably, the court wrote:
There is nothing implausible about the concern that Trader Joe’s will
suffer a tarnished reputation and resultant monetary harm in the
United States from contaminated goods sold in Canada. Incidents
of food-born illness regularly make international news, and Trader
Joe’s alleges that it is aware of at least one customer who became
sick after consuming food sold by Pirate Joe’s. Courts have held that

advertising, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); (4) federal trademark dilution, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c); (5) state trademark dilution, Wash. Rev. Code § 19.77.160; and (6)
deceptive business practices in violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act,
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.020.”).
16
Hallatt I, 981 F.Supp.2d 972, 972 (W.D. Wa. 2013).
17
Id. at 974; see also Bill Chappell, Pirate Joe’s Celebrates Dismissal of Lawsuit,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 5, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2013/10/05/229537625/pirate-joes-celebrates-dismissal-of-trader-joes-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/CP3W-NJSH].
18
Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 968.
19
Id. at 969. See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A.,
549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 1976). These Timberlane factors influenced sections 402
and 403 of the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, which
reflects this interest balancing approach. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-14. The
Ninth Circuit incorporated these factors, enunciated in the context of the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Antitrust Act, into its extraterritoriality
analysis of the Lanham Act. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556
F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977).
20
Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 975.
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reputational harm to an American plaintiff may constitute “some
effect” on American commerce.21
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Hallatt’s potential exhaustion (sometimes
referred to as “first sale”) defense,22 finding credible Trader Joe’s
allegations regarding Pirate Joe’s (1) lack of quality control and (2)
practice of charging higher prices for genuine Trader Joe’s products.
Trader Joe’s argued successfully that these practices warranted an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion, which generally prevents a
trademark owner from blocking the subsequent sale of a genuine good.23
Despite Hallatt’s attempt at crowd-funding to meet his mounting legal
fees,24 the litigation’s end was foretold as soon as Trader Joe’s complaint
was allowed to proceed. Soon thereafter, the parties settled and Hallatt
shuttered his business.25 Ironically, Trader Joe’s pending Canadian
trademark applications issued soon after the litigation ended.26
The Ninth Circuit’s decision was somewhat startling, even when
judged against the relatively liberal extraterritorial application of the
Lanham Act that it and other courts have employed.27 Notably, Trader
Joe’s had not alleged that Hallatt sold confusingly similar products within
the U.S., that any of his products somehow made their way back into the
U.S., or that his company directed advertisements or other marketing into
the U.S. Indeed, Pirate Joe’s business model was not one of confusing
U.S. consumers, but rather one of courting Canadian consumers with
21

Id. at 971.
Haight Farley, supra note 9, at 59-60. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXHAUSTION AND PARALLEL IMPORTS 390 (Irene Calboli &
Edward Lee eds., 2016).
23
Transcript of Oral Argument, Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960, 970-972 (9th Cir. 2016)
(No. 14-35035); Haight Farley, supra note 9, at 59-60.
24
Holpuch, supra note 6.
25
Christopher Mele, Pirate Joe’s, renegade reseller of Trader Joe’s products,
shuts down, THE BELLINGHAM HERALD (June 12, 2017, 07:43 AM)
https://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/article155178669.html
[https://perma.cc/4FE3-EK9H]. Throughout the publicity around the case, Hallatt
seemed to combine his rebel grocer instincts with those of a performance artist. For
example, one photo of Hallatt’s storefront shows the “P” deliberately missing from
“Pirate” so as to spell “irate Joe’s.” See Holpuch, supra note 6.
26
TRADER JOE’S, Registration No. TMA 958/215 (Can.); TRADER JOE’S
Design, Registration No. TMA 958/214 (Can.).
27
Holpuch, supra note 6 (quoting Christine Farley stating: “Just opening the door
to trademark owners to sue in the US courts for acts that occurred abroad and to be
able to survive a motion to dismiss is huge.”). See also William C. Johnston,
Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act Saves an American Brand from a
Canadian Retail Pirate, 40 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 165, 166 (2017); Recent
Cases, Foreign Relations Law—Lanham Act Extraterritoriality—Ninth Circuit Applies
Lanham Act to Wholly Foreign Sales, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1946, 1946 (2017).
22

FINAL_CHON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

106

B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.

8/1/19 11:34 PM

[Vol. 25:2

genuine Trader Joe’s products purchased from an authorized U.S. retail
source. Yet, despite no evidence that these re-sold goods had made their
way back into the U.S., the court managed to find that they had a
sufficient “effect” on U.S. commerce to state a claim for relief.
In so finding, the court relied on the landmark Steele v. Bulova case.28
Its analysis of that case, however, arguably extended extraterritoriality
well beyond the facts in Steele. The Steele defendant (a U.S. citizen) had
sold counterfeit watches in Mexico, where he had no rights to the
authentic manufacturer’s mark, and where that manufacturer’s U.S.
advertising had reached.29 Further, some of the defendant’s
extraterritorial sales were to U.S. citizens, who might have transported
the watches back to the U.S.30 In Trader Joe’s, by contrast, the litigation
involved a Canadian defendant who sold not counterfeit but rather
genuine goods, as well as undisputed facts showing that the authentic
manufacturer conducted no advertising or sales in Canada. Nor did the
plaintiff allege that any of these re-sold goods had made their way back
into the U.S. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s extraterritoriality analysis
functioned as a strong proxy for a weakly supported anti-dilution claim
with no definitive evidence of reputational harm in the U.S., and without
full consideration of any available defenses, statutory31 or otherwise.
The federal circuit courts have developed different standards for
determining whether commercial activity is sufficient to warrant
extraterritorial application of U.S. law — i.e., the “effects test.” For
instance, the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have stated that the
effect on U.S. commerce must be “substantial” before U.S. law will reach
extraterritorially.32 The First, Third, and Fourth Circuits instead require a
“significant effect.”33 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have framed the post-

28

Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 970-72 (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch, 344 U.S. 280, 286
(1952)).
29
See id.; see also GRAEME AUSTIN, The Story of Steele v. Bulova: Trademarks on
the Line, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 395, 400, 411 (Jane Ginsburg & Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
30
AUSTIN, supra note 29, at 401.
31
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012) (listing statutory defenses to anti-dilution).
32
Int’l Cafe, S.A.L., v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278
(11th Cir. 2001) (finding no “substantial effect” on United States commerce); Liberty
Toy Co. v. Fred Silber Co., No. 97-3177, 1998 WL 385469, at *6 (6th Cir. 1998)
(remanding for application of “substantial effects” test); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton
Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (adopting test requiring “substantial effect” on
United States commerce).
33
McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting test
requiring “significant effect” on United States commerce); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v.
Aeropower Co. Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring “significant effect”
on United States commerce). See also Scanvec Amiable Ltd. v. Chang, 80 F. App’x
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Steele test as one that only requires “some effect.”34 Whether the effect
on U.S. commerce must be substantial, significant, or just “some” (as in
Trader Joe’s), an overly-generous application of this test — combined
with an impoverished conception of the exhaustion rule — threatens the
business models of, among others, giant warehouse seller Costco,35 as
well as the more distributed but proliferating third party sellers
frequenting on-line platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Etsy, and the like.
Curbing the first sale doctrine based on sparse evidence of “effect” —
such as potential reputational damage — will disrupt these on-going
global commercial activities in plying gray market or other legitimate resold goods.
Less noticed than the arguable mischief to the first sale doctrine
caused by the expansive reach of its effects test, the Ninth Circuit also
broke with all other circuits in its procedural ruling. It created a new and
different circuit split by refusing to treat the test of the Lanham Act’s
extraterritoriality as one of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling instead that
this issue be treated on the merits. In doing so, however, it failed to
explicitly distinguish the controlling precedent, i.e., Steele. Instead, the
Trader Joe’s court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decisions in the
2006 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. case,36 as well as its 2010 Morrison v.
National Australia Bank case,37 finding that these more recent cases
superseded any previous Ninth Circuit decision considering this issue on
subject matter jurisdiction grounds. Yet neither the Ninth Circuit in Trader
Joe’s,38 nor the Supreme Court in Arbaugh or Morrison, directly
addressed or refuted the language in Steele with regard to subject matter

171, 181 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting a variant satisfied by either significant or substantial
effect).
34
Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding subject matter jurisdiction given “some effect” on United States commerce);
Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983)
(requiring “some effect” on United States commerce); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopting the Timberlane
“some effects” rule of reason in the context of the Lanham Act).
35
See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008),
aff’d, 562 U.S. 40 (2010).
36
546 U.S. 500 (2006).
37
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
38
VED P. NANDA ET AL., LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 8:26
(2018) (“The Ninth Circuit, at least on occasion, barely refers to the Bulova factors,
relying instead on a longer list of factors set forth in the first Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A. decision. Timberlane I set forth a fairly complex
balancing test applicable to antitrust jurisdiction. Ninth Circuit (and other) decisions
often rely on Timberlane in assessing jurisdiction under the Lanham Act.”).
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jurisdiction.39 Certainly, nothing in Arbaugh indicates that it intended to
overrule Steele sub silentio on this issue, although it is possible to
interpret Morrison as doing so.40 Regardless, the Ninth Circuit now
stands alone among all circuits in treating this issue as one on the
merits.41
Thus, the Trader Joe’s ruling brings to light previously submerged42
and unresolved questions that have developed in the wake of Steele.
Decisions in other areas of intellectual property law reveal the same
judicial inconsistency with respect to the threshold issue of whether to
treat the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law as a jurisdiction or merits
question.43 The extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws is a species of the more
39

Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. at 281 n.2 (1998) (“While the record
shows that plaintiff fully relied on his asserted cause of action ‘arising under’ the
Lanham Act, diversity of citizenship and the jurisdictional amount were also averred.
As we are concerned solely with the District Court’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this suit, we do not stop to consider the significance, if any, of those
averments.”); see also id. at 286 (“In the light of the broad jurisdictional grant in the
Lanham Act, we deem its scope to encompass petitioner’s activities here. His
operations and their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign
nation.”).
40
Morrison referred to Steele parenthetically, stating in a footnote: “although a
final case cited by the Solicitor General, . . . [Steele] might be read to permit
application of a nonextraterritorial statute whenever conduct in the United States
contributes to a violation abroad, we have since read it as interpreting the statute at
issue—the Lanham Act—to have extraterritorial effect.” Morrison, 561 U.S. at 272
n.11 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
41
Relying on the Trader Joe’s district court decision, this issue was characterized
as one of subject matter jurisdiction. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:58 (5th ed. 2017).
42
Elizabeth McCuskey uses “submerged” in conjunction with the unexamined
precedential consequences of unreported decisions that may have more detailed
reasoning as well as different outcomes from published decisions. Elizabeth Y.
McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 Nev. L.J. 515, 516 (2016). While McCuskey’s
use of the term serves an important purpose, this article uses the term “submerged”
in a different sense: to denote legal issues that have been allowed to proliferate in
their original form as having precedential value despite the waning quality or
relevance of that value.
43
For a discussion of the subject matter jurisdiction versus merits confusion in
copyright and patent cases see Marketa Trimble, The Territorial Discrepancy
between Intellectual Property Rights Infringement Claims and Remedies, 23 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 20 n.93) (on file with the Boston
University Journal of Science & Technology Law) (citing Geophysical Service, Inc. v.
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Copyright
Act’s insistence that infringing conduct be domestic offers an essential element of a
copyright infringement plaintiff’s claim, not of jurisdiction . . . . [B]ounding the reach
of the Copyright Act to territorial conduct presents a question of the merits of the
claim, not the jurisdiction of the court.”). Id. (citing to Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light
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general genus of jurisdiction, sometimes characterized as prescriptive
jurisdiction44 and/or prescriptive comity.45 Prescriptive jurisdiction
involves the authority of the state (typically a legislative authority, such
as Congress in the U.S.) to make its law applicable to persons or
activities.46 Relatedly, prescriptive comity involves deference by the state
to foreign lawmakers.47 The intertwining of procedural and substantive
Products, Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (“[W]hether the allegedly
infringing act happened in the United States is an element of the claim for patent
infringement, not a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction.”). Cf. Peter Starr Prod.
Co. v. Twin Cont’l Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986) (treating extraterritorial
application of the U.S. Copyright Act as a subject matter jurisdiction issue).
44
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. a (2018)
(“Jurisdiction to prescribe, also called prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction, concerns
the authority of a state to make law applicable to persons, property, or conduct.”).
Furthermore, Section 402 states:
(1) Subject to the constitutional limits set forth in § 403, the United States
exercises jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to:
(a) persons, property, and conduct within its territory;
(b) conduct that has a substantial effect within its territory;
(c) the conduct, interests, status, and relations of its nationals and residents
outside its territory; [and]
(d) certain conduct outside its territory that harms its nationals.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257 (characterizing
extraterritorial inquiry as one of prescriptive jurisdiction).
45
“In exercising jurisdiction to prescribe, the United States takes account of the
legitimate interests of other nations as a matter of prescriptive comity.” RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (2018) (emphasis added).
46
Howard Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the
Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 287, 298 (2012)
(“Prescriptive jurisdiction is the power of secular rulemakers to prescribe legal rules
and to regulate real-world behavior. It can be understood under any of our definitions:
as the power to assert regulatory authority over some actors and to prohibit or
regulate some conduct; as the power to establish Hohfeldian rights and duties; or as
the power to determine who can sue whom for what primary conduct. The most
common wielder of prescriptive jurisdiction is the legislature, which bears primary
responsibility for establishing prospective legal rules of general applicability to realworld behavior.”); see also P. Sean Morris, From Territorial to Universal: The
Extraterritoriality of Trademark Law and the Privatizing of International Law, 37
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 33, 58 (2019) (attributing the trifurcation of adjudicative,
prescriptive, and enforcement jurisdiction to FREDERICK MANN, THE DOCTRINE OF
JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964)).
47
William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2078 (2015) (characterizing deference to foreign lawmakers as prescriptive
comity); accord Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 NYU L. REV.
390, 392 (2017) (“Prescriptive comity doctrines manage the overlap in states’ power
to establish laws and regulate behavior, while adjudicative comity doctrines speak to
which sovereign should resolve a particular dispute.”).
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questions, while evident in many other areas of law, seems particularly
acute here.
The courts, including the Supreme Court, seem to indicate that the test
of extraterritoriality is identical, whether applied as a jurisdictional test or
applied as on the merits.48 This may or may not be true. As discussed in
more detail below, the procedural vehicles for these respective
dismissals — FRCP 12(b)(1) versus FRCP 12(b)(6) — have significantly
different strategic consequences, including the opportunity to raise
defenses at an early stage of litigation. If the issue of prescriptive
jurisdiction/comity is indeed more one of merits and less of jurisdiction
(despite the term “jurisdiction”), then it is time for the Supreme Court to
“kondo” Steele — ridding it of its excess subject matter jurisdictional
baggage and thereby signaling its endorsement of the Trader Joe’s
court’s merits-based approach to this question. This would not
necessarily require an overruling of Steele but rather a revisit to it,
particularly in light of recent cases emphasizing the importance of wellsupported jurisdictional classifications.
Beyond conceptual and theoretical tidiness regarding the jurisdictional
classification, courts also arguably require more guidance regarding
whether harm to trademark goodwill is sufficiently different from other
kinds of commercial harm to justify the generous extension of
extraterritoriality under the Lanham Act via the effects test. Increasingly,
courts seem to rely on activities that impact any aspect of the plaintiffs’
goodwill, even (as in Trader Joe’s) those conducted wholly outside the
U.S. and resulting in reputational harm only.49 This broad ambit may
make sense in the context of a global market of transnational goodwill
that crosses borders with the click of a mouse,50 or in the specific factual
setting of Trader Joe’s, which involved perishable food products.51
48
See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
49
Courts even find harm completely unrelated to the information economics of
trademark law “such as loaning funds or transacting bank business in the United
States (7 opinions (4.4%)) [or] the financial gain of a US entity (i.e., defendant)
received from abroad (5 opinions (3.14%)).” Tim W. Dornis, Behind the Steele
Curtain: An Empirical Study of Trademark Conflicts Law, 1952-2016, 20 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 567, 630 (2018). See also, e.g., Paulsson, 529 F.3d at 307 (finding subject
matter jurisdiction given “some effect” on United States commerce); Am. Rice, 701
F.2d at 414 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); Wells Fargo, 556 at 406 (adopting Timberlane
“some effects” rule of reason in the context of the Lanham Act).
50
See generally Graeme W. Austin, The Consumer in Cross-Border Passing Off
Cases, 47 VICT. U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 209 (2016); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The
Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling New Extraterritorial Reach of United States
Law, 81 N.C.L. REV. 483 (2003).
51
Jack Houston, A psychologist explains how Trader Joe’s gets you to spend
more money, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/trader-
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Nonetheless, the canard that trademark law is territorial52 is undermined
by notions of domestic effects that rely heavily on broad notions of
reputation-based harm rather than harm caused by consumer confusion.
The Ninth Circuit assumed, for example, that an American business was
harmed by what some left-coast Canadians might think about its
products after purchasing them from a store that was indisputably a
purveyor of resold goods. And this interpretation of “effects” flies in the
face of recent Supreme Court caselaw (albeit in the context of federal
securities rather than trademark law) rejecting a broad view of “effects.”53
The jurisdictional and merits aspects of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling are
inextricably fused. As previously noted, its approach to the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. law, whether on procedural or substantive grounds, is
arguably an outlier.54 This matters for both principled and strategic
reasons. From the perspective of legal principle, the circuit split created
by the Trader Joe’s decision suggests that correctly characterizing and
clarifying prescriptive jurisdiction will matter for many types of cases, not
just Lanham Act-based cases. From a strategic standpoint, the Ninth
Circuit has surpassed the Second Circuit as the most popular circuit for
filing extraterritorial Lanham Act actions. It also currently has a higher
extraterritoriality rate than the Second Circuit.55 To the extent that the
Trader Joe’s decision signals friendliness towards plaintiffs, it may
increase the incentive to forum-shop westward in Lanham Act cases,
joes-how-gets-you-spend-money-psychologist-2019-1 [https://perma.cc/L34S-TF26]
(“In short, they’re there to make your life easier. This ideology is embodied in their
food as well as specifically their frozen food. And Americans have always had a
certain affection for a heat-and-serve mentality. Frozen dinners are easy, fast, and
little mess.”).
52
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law
From the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 887 (2004).
53
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 258-59 (stating “[t]here is no more damning indictment of
the . . . ‘effects’ tests than the Second Circuit’s own declaration that ‘the presence or
absence of any single factor which was considered significant in other cases . . . is
not necessarily dispositive in future cases.’”).
54
See generally Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th
Cir. 1977).
55
Dornis, supra note 49, at 601 (“Regarding the number of newly filed cases, the
Ninth Circuit actually took the lead from the Second Circuit in 2007.”). Moreover:
[T]he Second Circuit is far from being the spearhead of extraterritoriality. While
that circuit remains the champion with regard to case numbers, its
extraterritoriality rate (48.84%) is below the overall average of 60.67%. This
number is particularly dramatic when compared with the Fifth Circuit, which
applied the Lanham Act extraterritorially in almost all of the opinions decided
there—12 out of 13 opinions, or 92.31%. In addition—and quite contrary to
conventional wisdom—the Ninth Circuit fails to meet its reputation as a rights
holder’s haven. Of course, its overall extraterritoriality rate is 65.85%.
Id. at 599.
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thus exacerbating the trend toward generous helpings of
extraterritoriality.
These important concerns are part of a larger debate about the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. intellectual property laws, including its
trademark laws.56 The remainder of this Article addresses these issues
as follows: Part I examines the possible bases for viewing the Lanham
Act’s extraterritorial reach as either a jurisdictional or a merits issue. It
briefly contrasts the doctrinal and strategic differences between a
dismissal based upon subject matter jurisdiction and one on the merits
while considering empirical data regarding published judicial decisions
on these motions,57 to explore what courts (post-Steele and pre-Trader
Joes) have been deciding “in action” as opposed to “in books.”58 Part II
then examines the Supreme Court’s general framework for
extraterritoriality analysis and explores how this question is currently
handled in the specific context of the Lanham Act. Further, it critically
examines how the Trader Joe’s court applied the effects test. Finally, it
links the previous sections to normative trademark policy, particularly the
scope of the exhaustion doctrine in the face of the expanding rights of
trademark owners.
At its core, Steele held that the Lanham Act has extraterritorial reach;
this holding has been followed faithfully by lower courts.59 While the
Supreme Court has been active lately in modernizing the federal
common law of extraterritoriality, it has not updated the reach of the
Lanham Act. Thus, it is timely to consider whether the Supreme Court
should “kondo” the iconic Steele v. Bulova decision, ridding it of
unnecessary doctrinal clutter and allowing the development of
extraterritoriality doctrine in trademark law to proceed with greater clarity,
if not with joy.60

56

See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age
of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997); Roger E. Schechter, The Case for Limited
Extraterritorial Reach of the Lanham Act, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 619 (1997); Dinwoodie,
supra note 52.
57
See generally Dornis, supra note 49 (coding all post-Steele cases deciding
extraterritoriality between 1952 and 2016).
58
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 12 (1910);
Bill Clune, Law in Action and Law on the Books: A Primer, NEW LEGAL REALISM:
EMPIRICAL L. & SOC’Y (June 12, 2013), http://newlegalrealism.org/2013/06/12/law-inaction-and-law-on-the-books-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/59Y6-2T5R].
59
Dornis, supra note 49, at 571. The Dornis database reflects “133 actual disputes
(until 2016)—with 159 database-accessible opinions (not necessarily published in the
reporters)—i.e., some ‘disputes’ ended up with decisions of the majority, and a
concurring or a dissenting opinion.” E-mail from Professor Tim Dornis to author (Mar.
5, 2019) (on file with author).
60
Kondo, supra note 1.
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JURISDICTION OR MERITS? THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE
LANHAM ACT
Parsing Jurisdiction: Laws in Books

The Supreme Court is re-visiting some of its earlier jurisdictional
rulings with a critical eye. For example, in Arbaugh, a unanimous
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Ginsburg, stated:
On the subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim for-relief
dichotomy, this Court and others have been less than meticulous.
Subject matter jurisdiction in federal question cases is sometimes
erroneously conflated with a plaintiff’s need and ability to prove the
defendant bound by the federal law asserted as the predicate for
relief—a merits-related determination.61
Arbaugh is part of a discernable project by the Court to clean up its
jurisprudence of jurisdiction, and to refuse to give precedent to “drive-by
jurisdictional rulings.”62 Its specific concern was whether Title VII’s
numerosity requirement is an element of a claim based on Congressional
power to regulate commerce. Many courts had treated this as a question
of subject matter jurisdiction, but the Court clarified that it is a merits
issue.63
While Arbaugh did not involve extraterritorial application of a federal
statute, the subsequent Morrison case involved the extraterritorial reach
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. In language that the Ninth
Circuit quoted in Trader Joe’s, the Morrison Court stated:
But to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct §
10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter
jurisdiction, by contrast, “refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.”
. . . It presents an issue quite separate from the question whether
the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief.”64

61

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 n.10 (2006). (“A claim invoking
federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . may be dismissed for want
of subject matter jurisdiction if it is not colorable, i.e., if it is “immaterial and made
solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or is “wholly insubstantial and
frivolous.” . . . Arbaugh’s case surely does not belong in that category.”).
62
Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)) (“The
short of the matter is that the jurisdictional character of the elements of the cause of
action . . . made no substantive difference (nor even any procedural difference that
the Court seemed aware of), had been assumed by the parties, and was assumed
without discussion by the Court. We have often said that drive-by jurisdictional rulings
of this sort . . . have no precedential effect.”). See also Wasserman, supra note 46,
at 308, n.107 (listing relevant cases).
63
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 512.
64
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010).
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Both Arbaugh and Morrison are fairly sparsely reasoned with regard to
the grounds for classifying an issue as a merits question rather than a
procedural one. Nonetheless, they both point strongly to the position that
the Trader Joe’s court eventually took.
More distantly, the Supreme Court had re-affirmed the extraterritorial
reach of the Lanham Act in the Aramco case, which rejected the
extraterritorial application of Title VII, but (in dicta) distinguished Steele
as marking a “broad jurisdictional grant” including “commerce with
foreign nations.”65 And most recently, the Court stated a test of
extraterritoriality in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community:
First, the Court asks whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been rebutted—i.e., whether the statute gives
a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. This
question is asked regardless of whether the particular statute
regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction.66
Thus the earlier Aramco opinion’s affirmation of Steele is couched in
fuzzy jurisdictional language later criticized in Arbaugh67 and without the
“clear, affirmative indication” required by RJR Nabisco.68
These and other cases indicate that the analysis of prescriptive
jurisdiction is the very opposite of trans-substantive.69 The question
65
EEOC v. Arab-American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 252 (1991) (“The
[Lanham] Act defined commerce as ‘all commerce which may lawfully be regulated
by Congress.’ The stated intent of the statute was ‘to regulate commerce within the
control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks
in such commerce.’ While recognizing that ‘the legislation of Congress will not extend
beyond the boundaries of the United States unless a contrary legislative intent
appears,’ the Court concluded that in light of the fact that the allegedly unlawful
conduct had some effects within the United States, coupled with the Act’s ‘broad
jurisdictional grant’ and its sweeping reach into ‘all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress,’ the statute was properly interpreted as applying abroad.”)
(citations omitted).
66
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2093-94 (2016) (emphasis added).
67
Indeed, the Arbaugh court critiqued its 1991 decision in Aramco, 499 U.S. 244—
a Title VII case involving extraterritorial application of laws — as having engaged in
an unthinkingly automatic subject matter jurisdiction classification. Arbaugh, 546 U.S.
at 512 (describing that the Aramco “judgment had been placed under a lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction label. We agreed with the lower courts’ view of the limited
geographical reach of the statute. En passant, we copied the petitioners’
characterizations of terms included in Title VII’s “Definitions” section as
“jurisdictional.” But our decision did not turn on that characterization.”) (citations
omitted).
68
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2094.
69
See David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law,
2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1203-07 (2013) (categorizing different degrees of substancespecific versus trans-substantive laws).
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whether a statute ought to have extraterritorial reach is highly dependent
on the precise statutory language at hand, Congressional intent, and
other factors.70 Relatedly, the question whether extraterritoriality is a
subject matter jurisdiction issue in any particular statutory context may
also depend on the specific statutory language from which this question
is presented. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg in Arbaugh suggested the
Congress had the power to turn what the Court deemed to be a merits
issue into a jurisdictional one, by enacting appropriate jurisdictional
statutes.71 And the Lanham Act contains a specific jurisdictional
provision72 that complicates any attempt to apply non-Lanham Act
precedents to it.
As a result of this statute-specificity, the Arbaugh and Morrison
analyses arguably cannot necessarily be applied across the board to all
commerce clause-based statutes. And if this is so, then what principled
basis exists for delineating subject matter jurisdiction from merits
questions more generally? Howard Wasserman has recently argued that
courts often confuse prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction and
adjudicative (or judicial) jurisdiction. As stated earlier, prescriptive
jurisdiction involves the authority of Congress to make its law applicable
to persons or activities.73 For example, according to the Restatement

70
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 133-134 (2013); Morrison
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 256-58 (2010); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007); RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2095, 2110, 2114. See
generally Rochelle Dreyfuss & Linda Silberman, Misappropriation on a Global Scale:
Extraterritoriality and Applicable Law in Transborder Trade Secrecy Cases, 8
CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 265, 291-295 (2017) (discussing recent development
in extraterritorial reach of different types of intellectual property laws).
71
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S., 514-15 (2006). Of course, Congress could
make the employee-numerosity requirement “jurisdictional,” just as it has made an
amount-in-controversy threshold an ingredient of subject matter jurisdiction in
delineating diversity-of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See also
Layne E. Kruse & Rebecca H. Benavides, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Federal
Court in International Cases, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND SUING
FOREIGN PARTIES IN THE U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 136 (David J. Levy ed., 2003) (“Federal
statutes may create original federal jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction in
international dispute by virtue of a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The grant
of ‘arising under’ jurisdiction in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution is not selfexecuting.”).
72
15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1998).
73
Wasserman, supra note 46, at 298-299. But see Dodge, supra note 47, at 2100
(“Prescriptive comity is comity to lawmakers—often legislatures, but sometimes
courts or executive branch officials. Furthermore, prescriptive comity is exercised by
courts. It is true that courts sometimes justify the extension of comity through
assumptions about what the legislature would want. It is also true that legislatures
sometimes speak directly to the recognition of foreign law or the extraterritorial reach
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(Fourth) of Foreign Relations,74 extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction
can be exercised when there are “substantial, direct, and foreseeable
effect upon . . . U.S. commerce”75 — an articulation of the effects test that
will be revisited in Part II.
The question of the Congressional authority and intent to exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction is at the very core of an extraterritoriality analysis,
in which courts must consider whether the legislature intended the reach
of a federal statute to regulate the conduct of persons beyond the
borders. According to Wasserman, this is a type of merits analysis that
goes to the scope of legislative power.76 Adjudicative jurisdiction, by
contrast, involves the judiciary’s “root power to adjudicate [a case]: to
hear and resolve legal and factual issues under substantive legal rules,
and to provide the adjudicative and remedial forum to resolve claims of
right.”77 In his view, the conceptual difference between prescriptive and
adjudicative jurisdiction provides the principled ground to differentiate
between a merits inquiry and a subject matter jurisdictional one.
In light of Arbaugh and Morrison, the key question is whether Steele
decided a question of prescriptive jurisdiction on the merits regarding
congressional authority to regulate extraterritorial conduct pursuant to
use “in commerce” or whether it was engaging in adjudicative jurisdiction
regarding the reach of its original jurisdiction. The Steele Court did not

of domestic law. But it is ultimately courts that interpret and apply these rules,
sometimes relying on background principles of ‘prescriptive comity’ to do so.”).
74
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (2018).
75
Id. (“Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable
is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate . . . the
link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the
activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable
effect upon or in the territory.”).
76
Wasserman, supra note 46, at 310 (“[T]he [Morrison] Court characterized
limitations on the scope and reach of the legal rule as merits-based simply because
what a legal rule prohibits and who it controls is, by its nature, a merits issue.”). See
also, John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional
Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2513, 2515 (1998) (“Congress with its substantive powers
can create, decline to create, or limit causes of action. It can determine who is entitled
to sue whom, for what, and for what remedy.”).
77
Wasserman, supra note 46, at 302-03. According to Wasserman, the on-going
confusion about the all-purpose word “jurisdiction” is due to a conflation between the
jurisdictional elements needed to prove a claim and judicial jurisdiction: “Jurisdictional
elements are about congressional jurisdiction—substantive congressional
constitutional power or authority—to regulate particular real-world conduct through
legislation. Jurisdictional elements have nothing to do with judicial jurisdiction—
judicial power or authority—to adjudicate a case or controversy between parties
under that statute.” Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV.
643, 684 (2005).
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use either of these terms, but it did frame the question presented this
way:
The issue is whether a United States District Court has jurisdiction
to award relief to an American corporation against acts of trade-mark
infringement and unfair competition consummated in a foreign
country by a citizen and resident of the United States
Resolution of the jurisdictional issue in this case therefore depends
on construction of exercised congressional power, not the limitations
upon that power itself. And since we do not pass on the merits of
Bulova’s claim, we need not now explore every facet of this complex
and controversial Act.78
The Court’s language in this part of the opinion is strongly suggestive
of prescriptive rather than adjudicative jurisdiction, whereby the Court is
evaluating the proper reach of Congressional power—as opposed to the
limits imposed on the federal judicial power authorized by Congress. It
thus indicates that the Court was actually engaging in a merits analysis,
i.e., analyzing prescriptive jurisdiction, despite language in the opinion
that refers to many different types of jurisdiction.79
The Steele Court undeniably cited extensively to federal statutes
governing original jurisdiction of the federal courts, such as 28 U.S.C. §§
1331,80 1332,81 and 1338,82 as well as to the Lanham Act’s specific
jurisdictional provision, which echoes the “arising under” language of
Sections 1331 and 1338.83 Furthermore, extraterritoriality analysis
78
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280, 281-283 (1952). However,
neither of the appellate briefs characterized the issue as one of subject matter
jurisdiction.
79
The Steele Court wrote “[t]he Lanham Act, on which Bulova posited its claims
to relief, confers broad jurisdictional powers upon the courts of the United States. The
statute’s expressed intent is. . . .” then it proceeded to lay out the purpose of the
statute, the scope of the cause of action, the grant of jurisdiction to claims “arising
under” and the available remedies. Id. at 283-284.
80
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”)
(emphasis added).
81
There was diversity between the parties as the plaintiff Bulova company was a
citizen of New York and defendants Steele and his wife were U.S. citizens, as well
as citizens of the state of Texas. Steele, 344 U.S. at 281.
82
28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a
substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or
trademark laws”) (emphasis added).
83
15 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012) (“The district and territorial courts of the United States
shall have original jurisdiction . . . of all actions arising under this chapter, without
regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship
of the parties.”).
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necessarily involves statutory interpretation of the “laws” of the United
States, including the Lanham Act, as well as federal common law
(including customary international law, conflicts of law, and comity).84
These various citations suggest that the Steele Court may have
perceived the question presented as whether a colorable federal
question existed as a basis for original jurisdiction of the district court.
However, virtually all commentators agree that the crux of the Steele
Court’s analysis is section 45 of the Lanham Act, specifically, the Court’s
reading of Congressional intent “to regulate commerce within the control
of Congress” in tandem with the statutory definition of commerce as “all
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”85 The Court’s
heavy reliance on these sections of the statute in its Steele opinion
resembles more of the modern take on the prescriptive jurisdiction of
Congress in the area of foreign relations86 rather than the traditional
subject matter jurisdiction analysis, which is primarily concerned with
channeling cases between federal and state judicial systems in a
domestic context.87
Furthermore, most modern “arising under” tests involve some
balancing of federal and state interests, based upon federalism
concerns,88 yet federalism-related balancing is absent from the various
tests for extraterritoriality. Federalism supplies the general rationale for
the channeling function of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to FRCP
12(b)(1): Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction under Article III
of the Constitution, with power to hear specifically defined categories of
cases, such as cases “arising under the Constitution, treaties, and laws
of the United States.”89 Conversely, state courts are courts of general
jurisdiction with the power and authority to hear any kind of case. A
plaintiff does not have a right to be in federal court for a federal claim,
84

Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 19, 19-21 (2008). Recent scholarly debate over the intended scope of “laws
of the United States” casts some doubt on the inclusion of non-statutory law such as
customary international law. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Constitution and the Law
of Nations, 106 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1661 (2018).
85
Steele, 344 U.S. at 282-84 (citing to Lanham Act §§ 39, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1121,
1127) (emphasis added).
86
In Morrison, the presumption was a matter of presumed congressional intent, a
“canon of construction . . . rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.”
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., , 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
87
Wasserman, supra note 77, at 702 (quoting Lea Brilmayer’s rule of substantive
relevance: “The question is whether a particular fact may be pled and proven in order
for the plaintiff to prevail in the identical civil action claiming a violation of the identical
federal statute brought in state court”) (citation omitted).
88
See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
312 (2005).
89
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
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unless Congress has created exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts
over a particular class of cases and the plaintiff can demonstrate that its
claims “arise under” those laws through a well-pleaded complaint, that is,
a complaint that raises federal issues in the claims (and does not
anticipate them through defenses).90
Yet, according to 28 U.S.C. § 1338, federal and state courts share
concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over Lanham Act cases.91 This
concurrent jurisdiction reflects the common law origins of current federal
trademark law, rooted in the longstanding doctrine of unfair
competition.92 As a result, state courts may also have opportunity to
apply extraterritoriality tests.93 Of course, federal courts often exercise
diversity or supplemental jurisdiction over state or common law claims of
unfair competition, in addition to federal question jurisdiction over the
Lanham Act claims. The absence of federalism balancing factors within
trademark law more generally and in the Steele opinion itself suggests
that the core concern of Steele was Congressional power, not federal
versus state judicial competence to adjudicate Lanham Act claims. Thus,
Steele decided a question of prescriptive jurisdiction – a merits issue –
despite (perhaps inadvertently) characterizing it as an issue of subject
matter jurisdiction.
B.

Parsing Jurisdiction: Rules in Books

At first glance what might appear to be an arcane procedural issue can
be significant for strategic reasons. If successful, either type of
dismissal—whether on subject matter jurisdiction grounds under FRCP
12(b)(1) or on the merits under FRCP 12(b)(6)—will give a defendant
procedural advantage by not allowing the case to proceed to the next,
fact-finding stage of litigation. But different dismissal motions raise
corresponding doctrinal and strategic advantages or disadvantages.
Whether a motion for dismissal is brought on grounds of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) or on the merits pursuant to FRCP

90

Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 151-54 (1908).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
92
Id. This section confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts for patent,
copyright, and other types of claims but does not include trademark claims in this list
of exclusivity. See also, Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879) (“Here is no
requirement that such person shall be engaged in the kind of commerce which
Congress is authorized to regulate. It is a general declaration that anybody in the
United States, and anybody in any other country which permits us to do the like, may,
by registering a trade-mark, have it fully protected.”).
93
Two state court cases decided extraterritoriality of the Lanham Act between
1952 and 2016. Dornis, supra note 49, at 583-84.
91
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12(b)(6) can matter in individual cases.94 The differences between them
fall into four broad categories: Construction of facts, standard of pleading
those facts, preclusive effect of judgment, and timing of the motions.
Extraterritoriality provides a fifth dimension of analysis that affects the
other four factors.
1.

Construing Facts

According to the Arbaugh court, a trial judge can review evidence on
contested facts in a FRCP 12(b)(1) decision.95 This power potentially
takes the factual disputes away from the jury, which is institutionally
empowered to find facts. In practice, some courts sometimes treat
contested facts in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion in the “light most favorable to
the plaintiff”—a standard that has long been associated with FRCP
12(b)(6) motions.96 The Ninth Circuit differentiates between facial and
factual attacks:
A facial attack asserts the allegations contained in the complaint are
insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. A factual
attack, in contrast, requires submission of evidence that calls into
dispute the truth of the allegations that support jurisdiction.97
Where the challenge goes beyond the allegations in the complaint to
their evidentiary sufficiency, through affidavits or otherwise, courts in the
Ninth Circuit will review evidence on those contested facts per Arbaugh.98
Otherwise the courts in the Ninth Circuit will view the facts alleged in the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
2.

The Requirement of Plausibility

More significantly, however, the facts undergirding a FRCP 12(b)(1)
motion are not required to meet the “plausibility” pleading standard that
94

Of course, it is possible that the exact procedural device for challenging
extraterritoriality may not make a difference, if the outcome of the extraterritoriality
test is the same no matter what rule is applied. Answering that hypothetical scenario,
however, would require an impossible experiment akin to a randomized controlled
trial in which the same cases with the same facts are decided by the same judge on
different rule-based motions. Some cases (such as Trader Joe’s Ninth Circuit
decision) suggest that the result might be the same either way. Yet, other cases
(discussed below) point to a different conclusion. See infra Part I. C.
95
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501-02 (2006).
96
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Pursuant to FRCP 12(d), if factual
allegations go beyond a pleading, then the 12(b)(6) motion is converted a FRCP 56
motion, which then turns on the presence or absence of any genuine dispute of
material fact.
97
See generally Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016).
98
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit treated the challenge as a facial one,
without conflicting facts. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 501.
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is required of factual allegations on the merits. The Supreme Court’s
Twombly and Iqbal decisions up-ended the relatively liberal pleading
standards of the federal procedural system.99 Now, notice pleading of
any claims under FRCP 12(b)(6) requires more than the mere factual
possibility — but rather the factual plausibility — of claims being alleged
in a complaint.100 This pleading standard now applies to any substantive
claims filed in federal court and can be particularly important where
defendant is in possession of most of the relevant information (which is
not necessarily as true of trademark cases as of employment
discrimination cases). In any event, this more exacting pleading standard
has not been applied to allegations of subject matter jurisdiction thus far.
3.

Preclusive Effect

Additionally, a FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal is not on the merits and
therefore does not have preclusive effect. This leaves the door open for
a persistent plaintiff to re-file in a different court—which could be viewed
as an advantage to the plaintiff unless the alternative forum is viewed as
less favorable. Since the plaintiff typically has the choice of where to file,
a dismissal based on subject matter jurisdiction grounds essentially
negates that choice and forces the plaintiff into its “option B,” negating
any initial forum-shopping decision. Nonetheless, the plaintiff still has a
possible future day in court somewhere and some day because the
dismissal based on subject matter jurisdiction is not considered to be on
the merits.
4.

Timing

A dismissal on FRCP 12(b)(1) grounds also has some material
procedural advantages for a defendant, such as the ability to be made at
any time, even on appeal, or be raised sua sponte by the judge.101 It
might also result in dismissal of any supplemental jurisdiction claims
based on state law, which are often alleged in cases invoking the Lanham
Act. Moreover, for a defendant arguing that the reach of a U.S. statute is
overly-broad, the symbolic significance of having a dismissal based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than on the merits, might be
important.102

99
See generally Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
100
See generally JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011); Aschroft, 556 U.S. 662; Bell Atlantic
Corp., 550 U.S. 516.
101
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
102
Cf. Wasserman, supra note 46, at 312 (discussing the position of religious
organizations that did not want secular authority to reach into religious affairs in the
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5. Impact of Extraterritoriality Analysis
Taken together, some characteristics of FRCP 12(b)(1) motions
possibly make these types of motions more plaintiff-friendly than FRCP
12(b)(6) motions. Most importantly, a dismissal on subject matter
jurisdiction grounds typically does not end the case, so a plaintiff may
have another bite at the proverbial apple in a different court.103
Furthermore, Rule 12(b)(1) motions, unlike Rule 12(b)(6) motions, are
not held to the standard of factual plausibility and any contested factual
allegations may be subject to an evidentiary hearing. Typically, these
factual issues go to the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts,
such as citizenship of the parties. In an extraterritoriality analysis, the
factual allegations address whether the plaintiff has satisfied the effects
test—resulting in a potentially much larger scope of facts not subject to
the plausibility pleading standard. In addition, Rule 12(b)(1) motions may
not include other defenses, such as those listed under FRCP 8(c).104 For
all these reasons it might be easier for a plaintiff to withstand dismissal if
extraterritoriality is analyzed via Rule 12(b)(1). Among the FRCP 12(b)(1)
characteristics that tend to favor defendants is that these motions can be
raised at any time.
However, the extraterritoriality question changes this general calculus.
Typically, if a federal court dismisses the case based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, then the plaintiff can re-file in state court, which then
considers the same exact question of extraterritoriality. Furthermore, in
the case of the extraterritorial analysis, an alternative forum presumably
might also be another country’s court (in addition to a state court with
regard to any state law claims).105 For instance, Trader Joe’s had
arguable legal avenues in Canada — even without a registered Canadian
mark — but presumably decided against filing in Canada, favoring its
home court advantage in the U.S. for strategic reasons.106 In these kinds
of cases, the alternative forum is often alternative to both federal and
context of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171 (2011)).
103
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d).
104
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (listing defenses such as statute of limitations); 5B CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL §1350 (3d
ed. 2004).
105
Trader Joe’s’ complaint contained allegations of violations of Washington state
law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of these claims, finding that they did not
reach extraterritorially. See generally Katherine Florey, Bridging the Divide: The Case
for Harmonizing State and Federal Extraterritoriality Principles After Morrison and
Kiobel, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEVELOP. L. J. 197 (2014); Katherine
Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the Extraterritorial
Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L.
REV. 535 (2012).
106
See supra Part II C
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state courts. For a plaintiff seeking a favorable application of U.S. law as
opposed to a possibly more hostile application of foreign law in a foreign
jurisdiction, this can pose a strategic disadvantage. It may also impact
the issue of scope of claims and remedies.107
A theoretical disadvantage for plaintiffs of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on
the merits is that these dismissals are more likely to have preclusive
effect.108 State courts are often faced with re-filed complaints after a
federal court dismisses a case on the merits and with prejudice. In most
cases, the common law doctrine of claim preclusion will apply to bar the
re-filing. In the case of foreign (particularly other non-common law)
courts, the preclusive effect of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may depend
upon whether a foreign jurisdiction has a similar preclusion doctrine.109
Such a dismissal raises the possibility of not having a second bite at the
apple, whether in the U.S. or in another country. Conversely, if the motion
is granted, the defendant will win — possibly for all time, since it is often
considered a final judgment on the merits — unless reversed on appeal.
For all these reasons and more, FRCP 12(b)(1) motions are not
completely fungible with Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
C. Parsing Jurisdiction: Laws and Rules in Action110
Interestingly, what seemed to have irked counsel for Trader Joe’s was
not the district court’s reliance on federal subject matter jurisdiction per
se (although the lawyers did argue vigorously against its application, as
will be discussed below). Rather, their main objection appeared to be that
the case was dismissed “with prejudice.”111 Having been given ample
107

Trimble, supra note 43.
District courts will often allow leave to amend under Rule 15 and therefore allow
at least one Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal without prejudice to amendment. See, e.g.,
Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 521 (7th Cir. 2015).
109
Again, a successful Rule 12(b)(6) motion, particularly one granted after
opportunity to amend to cure defects after successive motions, may be granted “with
prejudice.” JOE S. CECIL ET AL., supra note 100, at 7 n.12 (citing Chudnovsky v. Leviton
Mfg. Co., 158 F. App’x 312, 314 (2d Cir. 2005)).
110
The data discussed in this part of the article is based on Professor Tim Dornis’s
database comprised of all published cases between 1952 and 2016. Tim W. Dornis,
Database of Post-Steele Cases (2016) (unpublished) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Dornis Database].
111
Brief for Appellant at 17, Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-35035)
(“Although Hallatt never sought dismissal without leave to amend, and even though
Trader Joe’s expressly requested leave to amend in its opposition (D. Ct. Dkt. No. 28
at 18), the court dismissed Trader Joe’s Lanham Act claims with prejudice and
without leave to amend”) (emphasis added). At oral argument, however, counsel for
Trader Joe’s specifically disclaimed any desire to further amend – despite having
(and ultimately taking) the opportunity to amend its complaint. Transcript of Oral
Argument, Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-35035).
108
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opportunity to amend its original complaint (and having in fact done so),
Trader Joe’s chose to move forward with the same allegations in its
second amended complaint.112 Notably, both parties seem to have
agreed that FRCP 12(b)(1) or FRCP 12(b)(6) were perfect substitutes for
deciding the issue of extraterritoriality even though, as the preceding
section demonstrates, these motions have different procedural
consequences. Overall, these incongruities reflect the messiness of laws
(and rules) “in action” — which this section considers briefly.
In its appellate brief, Trader Joe’s argued that:
Under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts
have subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims arising under federal
law, including the Lanham Act. While Congress may place additional
limits on this jurisdiction, it must do so using clear language.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. . . . .
Relying on Timberlane and other pre-Arbaugh case law, the district
court found that the Lanham Act limited its subject-matter jurisdiction
over claims with extraterritorial reach. But nothing in the Lanham Act
expresses any congressional intent—much less clear intent—to
restrict the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts in Lanham
Act cases. On the contrary, through “sweeping” language, Congress
extended the Lanham Act to all “commerce within the control of
Congress.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.113
Trader Joe’s argument seems sufficiently straightforward on its face.
Nevertheless, the previous sections show why the doctrinal situation is a
bit more complex than presented by this brief. In reality, as a strategic
matter, it is unlikely that Trader Joe’s would have re-filed in state court
after dismissal in federal court.114 Nor was it blind-sided by a Rule
12(b)(1) motion made after the pre-trial period (as had been the case in

112
Transcript of Oral Argument, Hallat II, supra note 111. It is not clear why the
district court chose to grant Hallatt’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion “with prejudice,” — which
is an indication that the court thought it ought not to be re-filed anywhere, despite the
jurisdictional basis for dismissal.
113
Brief for Appellant, supra note 111, at 19; see also Brief for Appellee at 19,
Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-35035) ("[i]f the Court were to find that
Arbaugh applies and that the question of extraterritorial application of the Lanham
Act is a merits question rather than a subject matter jurisdiction question, the
Timberlane inquiry remains the same. Indeed, if the Court were to so hold and
remand this matter, Hallatt would simply be required to file the identical motion, but
characterize the motion as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.").
114
If Trader Joe’s had re-filed in state court, the claim might have been precluded.
In the event that the state court heard the case, then the extraterritoriality test would
be the same as the test applied in the federal district court – yet another clue that it
is not a question about subject matter jurisdiction. Wasserman, supra note 77, at 702
(citing to Lea Brilmayer’s rule of substantive relevance).
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Arbaugh). Instead, Trader Joe’s was likely worried about litigating in
Canada where its legal position might be less favorable or result in
delay.115
Moreover, the Trader Joe’s brief did not cite to any caselaw besides
Arbaugh to support its point regarding the distinction between merits and
subject matter jurisdiction. This is not as surprising. Prior to Trader Joe’s,
no other circuit court had held that extraterritoriality should be treated as
a merits issue in the context of the Lanham Act. In fact, at least seven
circuit courts continue to characterize this as a subject matter jurisdiction
question still controlled by Steele.116 As of the time of this publication, no
circuit court has followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit in jettisoning this
categorization – though some district courts seem to have done so.117
115
E-mail from Carys Craig, Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, to
author (Feb. 4, 2019) (on file with author) (“We do have case law that suggests that
mere advertising in Canada in the absence of providing any actual services in
Canada is not sufficient to constitute use in Canada . . . . That said, they still had
plenty of avenues open to them, if they wanted to protect their position in Canada.
First, they could have commenced use in Canada and could then have immediately
obtained the registration. Alternatively (although this would have meant giving up
their 2010 priority date), they could have re-applied to register in Canada on the basis
of their US registration without use in Canada (s. 16(2)), or by showing that they had
made the mark well known in Canada through advertising to potential dealers/users
(s. 16(1)).”); see also E-mail from Carys Craig, Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall
Law School, to author (Mar. 4, 2019) (on file with author) (“Trader Joe’s could also
have asserted common law trademark rights in the Vancouver/BC area by providing
evidence that its reputation and goodwill extended over the US-Canada border
notwithstanding the absence of local use (cp. Orkin Exterminating Co. Inc. v. Pestco
Co., 50 OR (2d) 726). In the Orkin case, a Canadian company adopted a well-known
but purely US-based mark and was held liable for passing off in Ontario.”).
116
Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2008)
(conducting a Lanham Act extraterritorial analysis under FRCP 12(b)(1)); McBee v.
Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (same); Scanvec Amiable Ltd. v.
Chang, No. 02–4385, 2003 WL 22597067, at *180-81 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Liberty
Toy Co. v. Fred Silber Co., No. 97-3177, 1998 WL 385469, at *6 (6th Cir. 1998)
(remanding for application of “substantial effects” test under FRCP 12(b)(1));
Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1994)
(analyzing Lanham Act extraterritorial analysis under FRCP 12(b)(1)); Am. Rice, Inc.
v. Arkansas Rice Growers Co-op. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408, 417 (5th Cir. 1983) (same);
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (same). In
addition, some district courts have resolved this in favor of subject matter jurisdiction
despite the absence of controlling precedent. See Int’l Acad. of Bus. & Fin. Mgmt.,
Ltd. v. Mentz, No. 12-CV-00463-CMA-BNB, 2013 WL 212640 (D. Colo. Jan. 18,
2013) (finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction under “substantial or significant”
effects test); Basis Int’l Ltd. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306
(D.N.M. 2011) (finding subject matter jurisdiction under “significant effects” test).
117
IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 3d 95, 121 (D.D.C. 2018); IPOX
Schuster, LLC v. Nikko Asset Mgmt. Co., 191 F. Supp. 3d 790, 804 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
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In circuits that explicitly classify this issue as a question of subject
matter jurisdiction, some lower courts have nonetheless decided this
issue on FRCP 12(b)(6) grounds. Examination of a recently compiled
database of all Lanham Act extraterritoriality cases decided between
1952 and 2016 reveals that forty-four cases were decided on preliminary
motions.118 Of the forty-four cases, at least fifteen courts decided
extraterritoriality on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds.119 The other twenty-nine
(including the Trader Joe’s district court) were decided on FRCP 12(b)(1)
grounds.120 Twelve of these forty-four cases overlapped both categories
and involved simultaneous consideration of Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6).121 In addition, out of these twelve cases, four courts found

(“The Court will thus analyze Nikko’s motion under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the wellpleaded allegations in IPOX’s complaint as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in IPOX’s favor”).
118
Dornis Database, supra note 110.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
See, e.g., JMC Rest. Holdings, LLC v. Pevida, No. 14CV6157WFKVMS, 2015
WL 9450597, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2015) (granting FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
motions); Kroma Makeup EU, Ltd. v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc., No. 6:14CV-1551-ORL, 2015 WL 1708757, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2015) (denying FRCP
12(b)(6) dismissal after defendant moved for both FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
dismissals); Gibson Brands Inc. v. Viacom Int’l Inc., No. CV 12-10870 DDP AJWX,
2013 WL 5940826, at * 6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (granting FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal
and dismissing FRCP 12(b)(6) motion as moot), rev’d and remanded, 640 F. App’x
677 (9th Cir. 2016); Hong Leong Fin. Ltd. (Singapore) v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd.,
No. 12 CIV. 6010 JMF, 2013 WL 5746126 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013) (finding subjectmatter jurisdiction but dismissing under FRCP 12(b)(6)); RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Zaller,
978 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (granting FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal after
defendant moved for both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissals); Airwair Int’l Ltd.
v. Vans, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-05060-EJD, 2013 WL 3786309 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013)
(granting FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal after defendant moved for both FRCP 12(b)(1)
and FRCP 12(b)(6) dismissals); Schreiber v. Dunabin, 938 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601-02
(E.D. Va. 2013) (granting FRCP 12(b)(1) and FRCP 12(b)(6) motions); Pinkberry,
Inc. v. JEC Int’l Corp., No. CV 11-6540 PSG PJWX, 2011 WL 6101828, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 7, 2011) (granting FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal and dismissing FRCP 12(b)(6)
motion as moot); Mertik Maxitrol GMBH & Co. KG v. Honeywell Techs. Sarl, No. 1012257, 2011 WL 1454067, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2011) (finding subject-matter
jurisdiction but dismissing under FRCP 12(b)(6); Warnaco Inc. v. VF Corp., 844 F.
Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (raising and finding subject-matter sua sponte and
dismissing defendant’s FRCP 12(b)(6) motion); Spartan Chem. Co. v. ATM
Enterprises of Am., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29147 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 1986) (finding
subject-matter jurisdiction but dismissing under FRCP 12(b)(6); Ramirez & Feraud
Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (finding subjectmatter jurisdiction and denying FRCP 12(b)(6) dismissal) aff’d, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.
1957).
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subject matter jurisdiction but then dismissed on the merits.122 Notably,
a recent case not captured in this data set, Charisma World Wide Corp.,
S.A. v. Avon Products Inc.,123 exemplifies a 12(b)(6) dismissal despite
controlling circuit precedent treating this question as a Rule 12(b)(1)
issue.
Furthermore, at least twenty-two courts have decided this issue on
summary judgment under FRCP 56 — and at least one after a jury trial.124
This may reflect the fact that objections based on subject matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any time.125 Or, despite stated precedent, it
may be that these courts already view prescriptive jurisdiction as at least
partly a merits issue in the context of the Lanham Act. In the larger
strategic context, little to no empirical evidence exists of cases re-filed in
state court after a federal court’s FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal.126 And with
only one exception,127 no published case decided after Steele shows that
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion or dismissal was made after an early pretrial stage
of litigation.
Overall, this empirical analysis indicates that despite broad judicial
consensus at the circuit court level, which still treats extraterritoriality
nominally as a subject matter jurisdiction question, the actual practice on
the ground since Steele has been variable. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s
holding is not completely out of line with other decisions. Returning to the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Trader Joe’s:
The constitutional source of [congressional] authority [to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause] is
the same whether or not the alleged infringement implicates the
extraterritorial scope of the Lanham Act: Congress can no more
regulate intrastate, non-commercial possession of another’s mark
. . . than trademark infringement that occurs entirely outside of the
country’s borders.128
This language indicates that the court was grappling with a question of
prescriptive jurisdiction: What constitutes activity “in commerce” sufficient
to allow Congress to assert its regulatory authority over this activity
pursuant to its interstate and foreign commerce power? However, the
opinion does not explicitly discuss the difference between prescriptive
122

Dornis Database, supra note 110.
243 F. Supp. 3d 450 (2017).
124
See, e.g., Groeneveld Transport Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Intern., Inc., 730
F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2013).
125
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
126
See Dornis, supra note 49, at 572. The cases listed in the Dornis database do
not include cases decided after 2016. See Dornis Database, supra note 110.
127
See Aerogroup Intern., Inc v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 955 F.Supp. 220
(1997). Again, this statement does not cover post-2016 decisions.
128
Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).
123
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and adjudicative jurisdiction. Nor does it explicitly address the Supreme
Court’s analysis of the Lanham Act with regard to purely intrastate
commerce – as, for example, in The Trade-Mark Cases.129 Instead, the
decision relies heavily on Ninth Circuit precedent such as La Quinta
Worldwide v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V.,130 wherein the court held that
intrastate commerce was not within the ambit of Congress’ power to
regulate pursuant to its commerce power. In regards to any conflicting
Ninth Circuit precedent, the decision also relied on Miller v. Gammie,
which instructs Ninth Circuit panels to consider the effect of Supreme
Court decisions on prior circuit precedent.131 Following Miller, if a
Supreme Court decision undercuts the theory or reasoning behind the
prior precedent, a Ninth Circuit panel can ignore a previous panel’s
precedent.132 Yet, while both Arbaugh and Morrison strongly indicate that
the Supreme Court wants to put its jurisdictional house in order, so to
speak, they are too domain-specific to undercut Steele and its progeny
entirely.133
At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as well as the variation
among courts suggest an on-going conceptual confusion about the basis
for the jurisdictional categorization of extraterritoriality. While courts
nominally treat this issue as one of subject matter jurisdiction in the
context of the Lanham Act, it is an issue that can also be decided on the
merits via FRCP 12(b)(6). As Justice Scalia noted in Morrison:
In view of this error, which the parties do not dispute, petitioners ask
us to remand. We think that unnecessary. Since nothing in the
analysis of the courts below turned on the mistake, a remand would

129
Cf. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879) (“Here is no requirement that
such person shall be engaged in the kind of commerce which Congress is authorized
to regulate. It is a general declaration that anybody in the United States, and anybody
in any other country which permits us to do the like, may, by registering a trade-mark,
have it fully protected.”).
130
La Quinta Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V., 762 F.3d 867, 872 (9th
Cir. 2014).
131
Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
132
See Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 967-68 n.4 (citing to Miller, 335 F.3d at 893). The
Miller rule, however, does not give a great deal of guidance to Ninth Circuit panels
on how to assess the undercutting theory, and therefore has led to some uncertainty
in its application. See BENNETT EVAN COOPER, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE: NINTH
CIRCUIT § 20:4 (2018) (Prior Ninth Circuit Decisions: Exceptions to Law of Circuit).
133
See generally Rochelle Dreyfuss & Linda Silberman, Misappropriation on a
Global Scale: Extraterritoriality and Applicable Law in Transborder Trade Secrecy
Cases, 8 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 265, 265, 297 (2017) (“These cases suggest
that the type of intellectual property might matter to the extraterritorial analysis.”).
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only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 12(b)(1)
conclusion.134
Perhaps it is not an urgent matter to tidy up this uncertainty. Yet, the
courts may be missing nuanced costs and benefits attached to either
motion when they fail to remand to the district court for a hearing on the
merits. Wasserman argues that the entanglement of jurisdiction with
merits is simply wrong. As he states:
Congress has made them distinct. . . . Relevant positive law
establishes that there is a cause of action, there is jurisdiction, and
the two must be handled differently.135
And the Supreme Court itself has signaled dissatisfaction with “drive-by
jurisdictional rulings,”136 making it even more appropriate for the Court to
step in and clarify the jurisdiction or merits question in the
extraterritoriality analysis for the Lanham Act.
II.
A.

EFFECTS OF THE EFFECTS TEST

Effects in Books

Part I argues that the Steele Court may have made a category mistake,
confusing prescriptive jurisdiction with adjudicative jurisdiction. The Court
mischaracterized the nature of the jurisdictional question presented —
possibly because the effects test was still in its infancy when Steele was
decided. Indeed, Bulova’s brief did not seem to characterize the
extraterritoriality issue as one of subject matter jurisdiction. Instead,
Bulova had argued:
The existence of jurisdiction to protect foreign commerce against
other types of anti-competitive acts abroad is illustrated in a long line
of Sherman Act cases. The basis for jurisdiction embraces two
principal aspects—personal jurisdiction over one or more of the
alleged conspirators, whether domestic or foreign . . . and the effect
of the alleged acts or conduct upon the foreign commerce of the
United States under the Sherman Act.137
This Part argues that the effects test itself, regardless of its jurisdictional
classification, also needs updating and clarification.138 The Supreme
Court’s stance toward extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis, whether
134

Morrison v. Nat’l Aus. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 354 (9th Cir. 2003).
Wasserman, supra note 77, at 672.
136
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens
for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).
137
Brief for Respondent at 28, Steele v. Bulova Watch Company, Inc., 342 U.S.
280 (1952) ((No. 38), 1952 WL 82566) (emphasis added).
138
See generally Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth
Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455 (2008).
135
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prescriptive or adjudicative, has evolved considerably since Steele. As
previously stated, the RJR Nabisco test involves two steps: first,
ascertaining whether the statute gives “clear affirmative indication that it
applies extraterritorially” and second determining “whether the case
involves a domestic application of the statute.”139 Yet Steele begs the
question of whether the Lanham Act includes a “clear, affirmative”
indication that Congress intended its extraterritorial application. Steele
was decided under an incipient analytical framework for assessing
extraterritorial reach — a framework that has developed tremendously in
the intervening sixty-plus years.
Even if step one of RJR Nabisco is indeed satisfied, and it is wellsettled as a matter of statutory interpretation that Congress did intend the
Lanham Act to reach beyond the borders of the U.S., it is not clear how
the second step incorporates Lanham Act-related effects, especially if
these effects are primarily or wholly reputation based. As Professor Tim
Dornis has observed:
Notably, the development of “effects on US commerce” into the most
influential test element and its widely overlooked foundation in preLanham Act common law doctrine can be explained as one of the
most determinative features of current law.140
And finally, neither step of RJR Nabisco clearly addresses the role of
comity and other factors. A court’s decision to apply a statute
extraterritoriality is one of discretion, not mandate. If the statute is silent,
then non-statutory factors are necessary to guide the decisions of courts.
The courts currently applying the effects test are relying on a multifactored set of judicially-developed standards to engage in this guided
discretion.
The Supreme Court’s recent look at the “conduct and-or effects” test
in Morrison found that test, as developed by the lower courts in the
context of securities fraud, to be sadly lacking.141 The majority went on

139

RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2094 (2016) (“If the
conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, then the case
involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad;
but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case
involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct
that occurred in U.S. territory.”).
140
Dornis, supra note 49, at 572; see generally TIM W. DORNIS, TRADEMARK AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION CONFLICTS HISTORICAL-COMPARATIVE, DOCTRINAL, AND
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (2017).
141
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 257-58 (2010) (quoting Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (1975)) (the “Second Circuit had excised
the presumption against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence . . . and replaced it
with the inquiry whether it would be reasonable (and hence what Congress would
have wanted) to apply the statute to a given situation. As long as there was
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to decry the unpredictability and uncertainty caused by the conduct andor effects test,142 and replaced this multi-factor test with a neon-bright
line rule that the purchase and sale of securities must be in the U.S. for
the federal courts to exert prescriptive jurisdiction over a federal
securities fraud case:
For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks
all contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog
indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity
is involved in the case.143
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg concurred only in the judgment. Their
view was that
[T]he real question in this case is how much, and what kinds of,
domestic contacts are sufficient to trigger application of § 10(b). In
developing its conduct and-or effects test, the Second Circuit
endeavored to derive a solution from the Exchange Act’s text,
structure, history, and purpose. Judge Friendly and his colleagues
were well aware that United States courts ‘cannot and should not
expend [their] resources resolving cases that do not affect
Americans or involve fraud emanating from America.’144
Morrison casts considerable uncertainty upon Steele. To be sure, the
specific question considered by Morrison involved the application of a
type of effects test in lieu of the first step — whether the statutory
language indicates its extraterritorial application. This threshold question
arguably was answered in the affirmative by Steele and even possibly
endorsed by Morrison, which cited approvingly to Steele in passing.145
The cumulative inference from this and other relatively recent and
approving citations146 is that the Supreme Court still approves of Steele.
prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate, the Second Circuit explained, whether to apply §
10(b) even to “predominantly foreign” transactions became a matter of whether a
court thought Congress ‘wished the precious resources of United States courts and
law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to
foreign countries.’”).
142
Id.
143
Id. at 266.
144
Id. at 281 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
145
Id. at 283 n.11.
146
See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 251 (1991)
(“In Steele, we addressed whether the Lanham Act, designed to prevent deceptive
and misleading use of trademarks, applied to acts of a United States citizen
consummated in Mexico . . . . The EEOC’s attempt to analogize these cases to
Steele is unpersuasive. The Lanham Act by its terms applies to ‘all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by Congress.’ . . . The Constitution gives Congress the
power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
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But, does the Lanham Act truly indicate a “clear, affirmative” intent by
Congress to legislate extraterritorially?
Furthermore, would not the general skepticism expressed in Morrison
toward the “conduct-and-or effects” test within the context of federal
securities laws equally apply to the effects test (or more accurately, tests)
developed in the wake of Steele? Different circuits have articulated
various effects tests. For example, in the early and influential Vanity Fair
v. Eaton case,147 the Second Circuit required “substantial” effect — a rule
that was subsequently adopted by a few other circuits.148 Others, like the
Ninth Circuit, require only “some” effect.”149 And still other circuits have
articulated this test as “significant” effect.150 The Restatement (Fourth) of
U.S. Foreign Relations Law offers the “substantial” effect version of
prescriptive jurisdiction.151
The Ninth Circuit has a specific judicial gloss on its “some effect” test.
As enunciated in 1975, the Ninth Circuit’s Timberlane test states a
tripartite rule of reason in the context of antitrust extraterritoriality:
As acknowledged above, the antitrust laws require in the first
instance that there be some effect actual or intended on American
foreign commerce before the federal courts may legitimately
exercise subject matter jurisdiction under those statutes. Second, a
and with the Indian Tribes.’ U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Since the Act expressly
stated that it applied to the extent of Congress’ power over commerce, the Court in
Steele concluded that Congress intended that the statute apply abroad.”)
Id. at 252.
147
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956)
(adopting test requiring “substantial effect” on United States commerce).
148
Int’l Cafe, S.A.L., v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278
(11th Cir. 2001) (finding no “substantial effect” on United States commerce); Liberty
Toy Co. v. Fred Silber Co., No. 97-3177, 1998 WL 385469, at *6 (6th Cir. 1998)
(remanding for application of “substantial effects” test); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton
Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (adopting test requiring “substantial effect” on
United States commerce).
149
Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding subject matter jurisdiction given “some effect” on United States commerce);
Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983)
(requiring “some effect” on United States commerce); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopting the Timberlane
“some effects” rule of reason in the context of the Lanham Act).
150
McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting test
requiring “significant effect” on United States commerce); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v.
Aeropower Co. Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring “significant effect”
on United States commerce). See also Scanvec Amiable Ltd. v. Chang, 80 F. App’x
171, 181 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting a variant satisfied by either significant or substantial
effect).
151
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (2018).
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greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to
demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to present a
cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of
the antitrust laws. . . . Third, there is the additional question which is
unique to the international setting of whether the interests of, and
links to, the United States including the magnitude of the effect on
American foreign commerce are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those
of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.152
Since this original formulation, the Ninth Circuit has also developed
seven different “comity” factors to assess further the third part of the test:
[1] the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
[2] the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or
principal places of business of corporations,
[3] the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected
to achieve compliance,
[4] the relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared with those elsewhere,
[5] the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce,
[6] the foreseeability of such effect, and
[7] the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within
the United States as compared with conduct abroad.153
Steele’s original doctrinal framework did not provide any of these glosses
(whether “substantial,” “significant,” or “some” effects), and listed only a
few relevant comity factors. Whatever the exact form of the effects test,
courts such as the Ninth Circuit engage in guided discretion regarding
the decision to extend the extraterritoriality presumably allowed by the
Lanham Act.
As various scholars have noted, comity is an ill-understood term.
Succinctly defined as “deference to foreign government actors that is not
required by international law but is incorporated in domestic law,”154 this

152
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 61315 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
153
Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960, 973-75 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit developed
these multiple factors in Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co. 769 F.2d 1393,
1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
154
Dodge, supra note 47, at 2078; see also Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of
International Comity, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 20 (2008) (“Scholars and courts
have characterized international comity inconsistently as a choice-of-law principle, a
synonym for private international law, a rule of public International law, a moral
obligation expediency, courtesy, reciprocity, utility, or diplomacy. Authorities disagree
as to whether comity is a rule of natural law, custom, treaty, or domestic law. Indeed,
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characterization belies the complexity of comity in all its forms as it is
currently deployed. For example, “[d]eference to foreign lawmakers has
been categorized as ‘prescriptive comity,’ deference to foreign tribunals
has been labelled as ‘adjudicative comity,’ and deference to foreign
governments as litigants can be called ‘sovereign party comity.’”155 The
first comity factor considered by the Ninth Circuit — that is, the degree of
conflict with foreign law or policy—does not begin to capture all these
different aspects of the term.
As to the question of the jurisdiction-merits classification previously
discussed in Part I, these additional seven factors complicate the
question of adjudicative or prescriptive jurisdiction by adding a layer
referred to as prescriptive comity (as opposed to adjudicative comity).156
In addition to satisfying comity concerns, courts also still must find
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, which may form an
additional barrier to hearing a case.157 Parenthetically, more than a
passing phenotypic resemblance exists between Judge Learned Hand’s
articulation of the effects test in the 1945 Alcoa decision158 and the
there is not even agreement that comity is a rule of law at all. Although other
jurisdictions sometimes employ the term comity as a synonym for diplomatic
immunity, in the United States comity has served as a principle of deference to foreign
law and foreign courts.”).
155
See generally Paul, supra note 154; see also Gardner, supra note 47, at 393
(“When people speak of forum non conveniens as a comity doctrine, they usually
have in mind negative adjudicative comity—of restraining the U.S. court’s exercise of
jurisdiction to avoid are meant to demonstrate respect for foreign legal systems. But
such dismissals can run counter to positive comity commitments as well: either the
positive adjudicative comity commitment to allow foreigners access to U.S. courts, or
the positive prescriptive comity commitment to apply foreign law when appropriate.
Too little sensitivity to these positive comity commitments in transnational litigation
can undermine reciprocity between countries, which in turn jeopardizes the interests
of private parties.”).
156
See generally Gardner, supra note 47 (discussing adjudicative comity in the
doctrine of forum non conveniens); Dodge, supra note 45, at 2124 (“Even when
adjudicative comity operates as a principle of restraint—the area in which
international comity doctrines like forum non conveniens most frequently take the
form of standards—more rule-like alternatives exist.”).
157
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA TRIMBLE LANDOVA, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 39-40 (Foundation Press 4th ed. 2015) (“Personal
Jurisdiction, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and the Territorial Scope of Applicable Law.
What connections exist among personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and
the territorial scope of applicable law? Although they are three separate concepts, an
inquiry into the territorial scope of applicable law can arise in analyses of personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.”).
158
Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1455, 1472 (2008) (citing to United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa),
148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945)) (noting that Judge Hand held “that agreements,
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Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction “contacts” test in International
Shoe v. State of Washington,159 decided in the same year. Both of these
tests exemplify an urge to fashion a “reasonableness” test perceived
during the mid-century as more responsive to cross-border commercial
activity than the rigid territorially-based tests prevalent then. However, it
goes without saying that this fairness or reasonableness-based approach
to prescriptive jurisdiction on the one hand, and personal jurisdiction on
the other, faces tremendous challenges in this era of digitized and
pervasive global commerce. With trademark law’s extraterritorial reach,
“national and international regimes are competing for the right to
regulate.”160
Since Steele, the circuits have served as laboratories for the
development of different versions of the effects test to guide discretion of
the courts. And regardless of whether the doctrinal differences in these
circuit-specific tests cause differences in outcome, it is now apparent that
the circuits have different rates of finding extraterritoriality.161 The Ninth
Circuit reasoning in Trader Joe’s arguably exemplifies why its rate is the
highest among circuits.
B.

Effects in Action

Trader Joe’s had argued to the Ninth Circuit that the Timberlane
factors were superseded by Arbaugh and other cases.162 However, the
Ninth Circuit declined the appellant’s invitation to re-write the Timberlane
test.163 While it rejected the subject matter jurisdiction label, it then
evaluated on the merits whether Hallatt’s activities had “some effect” on
American commerce. It viewed its application of Timberlane as fulfilling
step two of RJR Nabisco:
though made abroad, are still unlawful if they are intended to affect imports and
actually do affect them”).
159
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also generally Paul,
supra note 154.
160
Morris, supra note 46, at 47.
161
See generally Dornis, supra note 49, at 572.
162
It is not at all clear whether the Timberlane test remains viable on its own terms.
The test was first devised for antitrust cases, and it has since been abandoned in that
context. See McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 814 (9th Cir. 1988)
(explaining that the Timberlane decision is superseded by statute). The test also was
devised as a method for determining the limits of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather
than the substantive scope of the statute, but concerns about the limited reach of
judicial power are no longer at issue.” Brief for Appellant, supra note 111, at 32.
163
See Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2016). The original Timberlane
opinion blurred the lines between Rules FRCP 12(b)(1), FRCP 12(b)(6), and FRCP
56, ultimately deciding the case on the merits, despite its language referencing
subject matter jurisdiction. Timberlane, Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A,
549 F.2d 597, 601-03 (1976).
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We next consider the limits, if any, Congress imposed on the Act’s
extraterritorial application. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S.Ct. at 2101
(discussing ‘‘step two’’). In 15 U.S.C. § 1127, Congress directed that
the Lanham Act applies to ‘‘all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress.’’ Whether this provision sweeps foreign
activities into the Act’s proscriptive reach depends on a three-part
test we originally applied to the Sherman Act in Timberlane . . . . See
Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 427 (extending Timberlane test to the
Lanham Act).164
With this doctrinal backdrop, the Ninth’s Circuit found that:
Plaintiffs usually satisfy Timberlane’s first and second prongs by
alleging that infringing goods, though sold initially in a foreign
country, flowed into American domestic markets . . . .
Trader Joe’s alleges that Hallatt’s foreign conduct has ‘‘some effect’’
on American commerce because his activities harm its reputation
and decrease the value of its American-held trademarks. It argues
that Hallatt violates 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), the Lanham Act’s
general prohibition on trademark infringement, by transporting and
selling Trader Joe’s goods without using proper quality control
measures or established product recall practices.165
Extraterritoriality aside, this “any harm to goodwill” approach to satisfying
the “some effects” test has potential to create mischief in U.S. trademark
doctrine. The court specifically did not limit its holding to the facts, which
involve perishable food products where the risk to human health is
greater than other areas of re-sold goods.166 Although the court invoked
Section 1114 of the statute based on consumer confusion, its holding
relies almost entirely on potential reputation-based damage that may or
may not have caused confusion or have occurred within the borders of
the U.S.167
In the course of the court’s denial of the FRCP 12(b)(6) motion, the
Ninth Circuit also minimized a potential first sale defense:
Trader Joe’s seeks to circumvent the first sale doctrine, which
establishes that “resale by the first purchaser of the original article
under the producer’s trademark is generally neither trademark
infringement nor unfair competition.” The quality control theory of
infringement is cognizable under the Lanham Act notwithstanding
the first sale doctrine: “[d]istribution of a product that does not meet

164
165
166
167

Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 969.
Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 969-70 (emphasis added).
Id. at 963, 970.
Id. at 977.
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the trademark holder’s quality control standards may result in the
devaluation of the mark by tarnishing its image.”168
And despite clear statements in both appellate briefs, as well as in oral
argument, that Trader Joe’s had not commenced use and therefore did
not have enforceable rights yet in Canada,169 the Ninth Circuit
downplayed the importance of “use” in the context of enforceable
trademark rights, preferring to focus on use inside the territorial
boundaries of the U.S. rather than the lack of use inside Canada.170 It
also did not consider the application of any applicable Canadian first sale
defense. If comity doctrines call on courts either “to avoid stepping on
the toes of foreign states” or “to step temporarily into the shoes of foreign
sovereigns to protect those sovereigns’ interests,”171 then a more
comprehensive analysis of conflicts and comity might consider whether
Trader Joe’s should have waited until it perfected its pending Canadian
applications before filing suit (1) in Canada; (2) against a Canadian
citizen; (3) for activities in Canada; and (4) in connection with what is
essentially a Canadian business operation. While it may be true that no
adversarial proceeding existed in Canada, that is because there was no
use by Trader Joe’s as an on-going business in Canada.172
The U.S. court’s minimization of the current use requirement in
Canadian trademark law, similar to U.S. law’s contemporary “use in
commerce” requirement, raises an issue of whether U.S. courts have the
institutional competence to analyze comity factors such as the degree of
conflict with foreign law or policy, or the relative importance of the
168

Id. at 970 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Hallatt had argued:
Trader Joe’s does not have enforceable trademark rights in Canada, as it has
not yet commenced use of the marks in Canada. . . . Moreover, even if Trader
Joe’s had enforceable rights in Canada—which it does not—Canada has its own
trademark law which does not mirror the U.S. trademark law and which, indeed,
has some significant differences from U.S. law in material respects [citing to
sources analyzing Canadian anti-dilution laws].
Appellee’s Answering Brief at 31, Trader Joe’s v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016)
(No. 14-35035). Trader Joe’s had argued:
Trader Joe’s . . . has two trademark applications pending in Canada. Those
applications do not constitute an adversarial proceeding between the parties.
While Canadian law, like U.S. law, allows for opposition of a trademark
application, Hallatt has never availed himself of this process. It is too late for him
to do so now, because the Canadian Intellectual Property Office issued notices
of allowances for both of Trader Joe’s applications in 2012.
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 111, at 45 (citation omitted).
170
Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 973.
171
Gardner, supra note 47, at 392-93 (original emphasis).
172
Canada is transitioning to a registration-based system of trademark rights. But
as of the time of this writing, Canadian trademark laws are use-based. Bita Amani &
Carys Craig, The ‘Jus’ of Use: Trademarks in Transition, 30 I.P.J. 217, 220 (2018).
169
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violations within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
After all, Trader Joe’s involved relatively easy-to-understand common
law jurisprudence in Canada: an English (and French) language
jurisdiction.
If prescriptive comity is supposed to function as a type of deference to
foreign lawmakers,173 Trader Joe’s indicates that courts can pay lip
service to it in the context of the Lanham Act. This approach is in direct
contrast to the Morrison Court’s injunction that only direct sales of
securities within the domestic territory of the U.S. can trigger liability
under the federal securities laws. The arguably favorable attitude toward
extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act further opens the door for
litigants (whether U.S. nationals or not) to take advantage of more
favorable laws in the U.S. regarding anti-dilution or other claims, without
an adequate showing of connecting activities within the U.S.174
Across circuits, courts have found extraterritorial application in over 60
percent of reported cases.175 Post-Steele extraterritoriality analysis has
evolved towards plaintiff-friendliness, whether it relates to procedure and
substance. In analyzing the decisions of courts applying the Timberlane
test between 1952-2016, Dornis has found a high correlation between
the effects test favoring extraterritoriality and a judicial decision in favor
of extraterritoriality: 88.46%.176 In addition, he found that Timberlane’s
seven additional comity factors appears to be fully determinative, both
when favoring and when disfavoring extraterritoriality.177 Trader Joe’s is
no different from other cases in the Ninth Circuit in this regard.
The Trader Joe’s decision is reflective of the highly dynamic nature of
globalized and digitized business and the attendant trademark goodwill
of U.S.-based companies. The involvement of U.S. actors and U.S.
interests in many of these cases also suggests that extraterritorial reach

173

Dodge, supra note 47, at 2078.
Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270 (2010) (“While there
is no reason to believe that the United States has become the Barbary Coast for
those perpetrating frauds on foreign securities markets, some fear that it has become
the Shangri–La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly
cheated in foreign securities markets.”).
175
Dornis, supra note 49, at 594 (“US nationals and entities can be expected to
crowd the defendant’s bench. . . . The majority of disputes (68.43%) featured at least
one US national or entity on the defendant side.”). Of course, these statistics have to
be taken with a grain of salt, as reported cases do not represent the whole universe
of decisions. See generally McCuskey, supra note 42.
176
Dornis, supra note 49, at 607-609 (“Among 63 [non-Timberlane test] opinions
that found the result of the effects test to favor extraterritoriality, courts applied the
Lanham Act 96.83% of the time.”).
177
Id. at 607.
174
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of the Lanham Act is defensible, at least when involving U.S. parties.178
But even if that is so, it may not be consistent with trademark policy,
which the next section considers.
C. Combining Books and Action: The “Glocalization”179 of Trademark
Policies
The effects test does not produce certainty, predictability, or
reproducibility of results. This section briefly argues a different point: The
extraterritoriality tests are not well-calibrated to core trademark policies
of avoiding consumer confusion or protecting legitimate business
investment. In tandem with a liberal effects test: (1) the anti-dilution
theories of relief will have greater, perhaps out-sized, influence relative
to other theories of harm based upon consumer confusion; and (2) the
first sale doctrine will be eroded almost completely, to the detriment of
businesses that rely on this long-standing principle of international
exhaustion. While these trends may help certain U.S. industries, they will
certainly harm others such as the increasing proportion of commerce
engaged in by so-called “third party sellers.”
Because the Trader Joe’s complaint alleged only reputational and not
economic damage, the most plausible theory of recovery on the record
presented before the court was anti-dilution180 of trademark goodwill—
propounded through a “quality control” exception to exhaustion. Thus, it
is not a stretch to say that the court endorsed a transnational goodwill
concept through its finding of “some effect” on U.S. commerce.181 Yet as
the Supreme Court famously proclaimed in Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf: “the mark, of itself, cannot travel to markets where there is no
article to wear the badge and no trader to offer the article. . . . [T]he trademark right assigned . . . [cannot be] greater in extent than the trade in
which it [is] used.”182 By enlarging the scope of transnational goodwill,
178

Dornis, supra note 49, at 594 (“More concretely, 31.58% (42 out of 133) of
cases involved only US nationals or entities as defendants, and 36.84% (49 out of
133) involved at least one US defendant together with foreign individuals or entities.
Only 17.29% (23 out of 133) of the disputes featured a defendant bench comprised
solely of foreign individuals or corporations.”).
179
Piero Bassetti, Editorial, GLOCALISM: JOURNAL OF CULTURE, POLITICS AND
INNOVATION (2013).
180
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
181
Cf. Morris, supra note 46, at 83-84 (“[W]hen trademark laws are
extraterritorially applied, they in effect create some form of universal guarantee or
global norm . . . . As a result, international intellectual property rules are increasingly
shaped by private regulatory activities.”).
182
240 U.S. 403, 416-17 (1916) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see
Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that
use within the U.S. is not a pre-requisite to an unfair competition claim based upon
section 43(a)).
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the effects test becomes a proxy for global anti-dilution claims without
statutory defenses183 or common law defenses such as exhaustion.184
This is especially true if courts decide cases on preliminary motions,
before defendants have a full opportunity to raise defenses.185
Moreover, the continual erosion of the international exhaustion rule in
trademark law through a broadened scope of exceptions has impacts on
not just foreign, but also American, businesses. For example, as of late
2017, more than 300,000 small and medium enterprises were vendors
on Amazon Prime alone.186 On-line retail platforms such as Amazon,
eBay, Etsy, and Walmart accounted for a majority of the approximately
$1.86 trillion global web sales in 2018.187 A large percentage of sales on
these platforms are transacted through re-sellers, colloquially known as
third party sellers, many based in the U.S.188
The trademark owner’s ability to engage in quality control along global
supply chains (or “global value networks”) is a serious concern,
particularly in the case of food, pharmaceuticals, and other items for
183

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012).
Cf. Brief of 25 Intellectual Property Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Kirtsaeng v. Jon Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (No. 11697) (describing common law origins of the first sale doctrine in the context of
copyright law).
185
It may be that the extraterritoriality issue should be raised in a preliminary
hearing, analogous to a Markman hearing in patent law, so as to allow the court to
consider the full range of claims and defenses on a developed evidentiary record.
See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
186
See Pamela N. Danziger, Thinking of Selling on Amazon?: Here are the Pros
and
Cons,
FORBES
(Apr.
27,
2018,
1:55
PM)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pamdanziger/2018/04/27/pros-and-cons-of-amazonmarketplace-for-small-and-mid-sized-businesses/#1886fb416867
[https://perma.cc/7NSQ-K3GP].
187
See Fareeha Ali, Inforgraphic: What are the Top Online Marketplaces?, DIGITAL
COM. 360 (Feb. 8, 2019) https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/article/infographictop-online-marketplaces/ [https://perma.cc/MSF5-KAMY] (“The top online
marketplaces in the world sold $1.86 trillion in 2018. Sales on marketplace sites . . .
accounted for 52% of global web sales in 2018, according to Internet Retailer’s
analysis.”).
188
Rachel Siegel, ‘Flesh and blood robots for Amazon’: They raid clearance aisles
and resell it all online for a profit, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2019)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/flesh-and-blood-robots-foramazon-they-raid-clearance-aisles-and-resell-it-all-online-for-aprofit/2019/02/08/f71bff72-2a60-11e9-984d9b8fba003e81_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b4109c7ffb45
[https://perma.cc/25HZ-2HBZ]. See also Feng Zhu & Qihong Liu, Competing with
complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com, STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2618, 2624
(2018) (estimating that 40 percent of Amazon’s sales in 2013 were attributable to
third party sellers).
184
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which quality control is important to consumer health.189 However, the
quality control exception has become a rationale for trademark owners
to wield virtually absolute control over subsequent sales of all manner of
goods, in defiance of the exhaustion principle’s policy against restraint of
trade in chattel via intellectual property. As Charles Colman has
observed:
[T]he purported “general rule”—“that a trademark owner’s
authorized initial sale of its product exhausts the trademark owner’s
right to maintain control” — has now become the exception.190
Other scholars have documented the expanding and often legitimate
functions of trademark goodwill in global markets.191 Yet absent
multilateral consensus about the legal treatment of goodwill, an overlybroad application of U.S. principles via the effects test unilaterally
imposes these U.S. perspectives and values upon the rest of the world
through the actions of private actors able to take strategic advantage of
different legal rules across borders. This could backfire, harming U.S.
interests in the international sphere, if individual profit maximization
distorts the general social welfare produced by healthy competition
among firms.
CONCLUSION: KONDO-ING STEELE IN LIGHT OF TRADER JOE’S
Steele is fairly formidable precedent. It continues to impact decisions
about the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act and it has been cited
over 2,000 times, as befits a pioneering case involving extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws. While its authority remains solid in many
respects, it has an uncertain relation to more recent cases such as
Arbaugh and Morrison, which frown on unnecessary subject matter
jurisdictional characterizations. Furthermore, Steele’s complete reliance
189
Margaret Chon, Trademark Goodwill as a Public Good: Brands and Innovations
in Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 277, 297 (2017).
190
Charles E. Colman, Post-Kirtsaeng, ‘Material Differences’ Between Copyright
and Trademark Law’s Treatment of Gray Goods Persist 6 (N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal
Theory Working Paper No. 13-40, 2013) (“[O]ne federal court after another . . . has
added to the list of potentially “material” differences between goods for purposes of
trademark liability, [thus] dealing in most types of gray goods has become a risky
endeavor. The boundaries of permissible conduct are difficult to locate in the case
law. . . .”).
191
Graeme Dinwoodie has differentiated between social and commercial
practices around trademark rights in common law countries, which are based on use,
and political authority regarding trademark rights, which correlate heavily with civil
law jurisdictions, arguing that an overly-expansive view of “use” possibly exacerbates
the differences between common law jurisdictions (which require use) and civil law
jurisdictions (which are registration-based). Dinwoodie, supra note 52, at 888, 913,
918; see also Austin, supra note 29, 412-19.
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on Section 45 of the Lanham Act arguably does not comport with the RJR
Nabisco’s rule of “clear, affirmative indication” of Congressional intent to
extend the Lanham Act extraterritorially. Finally, Steele’s ambiguous
“effects test” has allowed the development of a possibly over-broad
scope of extraterritoriality in subsequent caselaw, which flies in the face
of the Morrison reasoning.
The current version of the effects test seems to be a conceptual hybrid
existing somewhere between jurisdiction and merits. It may be that the
federal common law of extraterritoriality is simply too heterogeneous to
fit into the current vehicles provided by the FRCP.192 Much of the
evidence and arguments presented here suggest that the Steele
extraterritoriality test is an issue that should be characterized as an issue
on the merits. If so, then as the Supreme Court did with Title VII in
Arbaugh and the Securities and Exchange Act in Morrison, it can take
swift action with the Lanham Act. On the other hand, if this issue is
essentially a jurisdictional one, despite the Morrison ruling, then either
the Court should address the new circuit split or Congress should enact
a jurisdictional statute193 to make this jurisdictional classification clear.
As importantly, the Court can also give greater guidance to future
courts and parties about how to approach the discretion-laden decision
to apply U.S. law to activities impacting U.S. commerce in this era of
increasingly globalized trademark goodwill. It can and should “kondo”194
the status of prescriptive jurisdictional disputes in the Lanham Act—
instead of over-relying on federal common law with its tortuously slow
development in the face of fast-moving commercial activities.

192
The current situation with the law of extraterritorial jurisdiction might be
analogized to the common law of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction prior to the
enactment of section 1367. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012).
193
Or perhaps, more narrowly, Congress could amend the Lanham Act to make
clear that extraterritoriality is a jurisdictional inquiry in the specific context of
trademark law. Id.
194
Zimmer, supra note 1.

